The problem of foreknowledge and freedom presents a challenge to the defender of traditional Western theism. Nelson Pike has argued that the existence of an essentially omniscient God who possesses foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. Pike's opponents in this matter, among whom is Alvin Plantinga, argue that no incompatibility has yet been shown. I shall develop the view that neither Pike nor his opponents have conclusively settled the question whether foreknowledge and freedom are compatible. Furthermore there is a reason why the issue has not been, and may never be, conclusively settled: it is an inherently paradoxical issue. To aid in demonstrating this point I shall discuss a modified version of a paradox that has come to be known as Newcomb's Problem.
In his discussion Pike offers us a paradigm case on which we may focus our attention: on a given Saturday Jones mows his lawn and eighty years earlier Yahweh (who is God and is thus essentially omniscient) believed that on Saturday Jones would mow his lawn.
1 In considering this case I shall follow Pike in assuming that 'Yahweh' is a proper name and that 'God' is a title term.
2 Note that the paradigm Pike offers might normally be interpreted as lacking a moral dimension: in most cases the mowing of a lawn is not an action to be evaluated from a moral point of view. Nonetheless one can easily imagine contexts in which a moral evaluation would be appropriate, e.g., Jones mows the lawn signalling a neighbour to commit a murder. It is this kind of imaginary context that presents a difficulty for the theist who believes that Yahweh justly holds Jones responsible for his action, even while Yahweh's foreknowledge seems to imply that Jones did not freely mow the lawn. In this paper I shall be concerned only with the question whether foreknowledge implies a lack of freedom and not with the relation of this question to Yahweh's moral qualities. 1 Pike argues that in order for Jones's action on Saturday to be free, Jones must be free to refrain from mowing the lawn. In order for Jones to be free to refrain from mowing the lawn the following must be true: (Q,) Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way it would be false that eighty years ago Yahweh (who is God and is thus essentially omniscient) truly believed that Jones would mow the lawn.
Pike claims that in order for (QJ to be true one of the following options must be true:
(i) Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh's belief of eighty years ago would have been false. (ii) Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh would have believed eighty years ago that Jones would refrain from mowing the lawn, (iii) Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh would not have existed eighty years ago.
The first of these options is implausible because of divine infallibility. Yahweh is an infallible God, and in virtue of a doctrine of divine essential predication it is not possible for Yahweh to hold a false belief.
1 Since Jones is not free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way an impossible state of affairs would have existed, he is not free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way one of Yahweh's beliefs would have been false. Thus option (i) does not provide a basis for the claim that Jones is free to refrain from mowing the lawn.
The second of the options avoids the difficulty of the first by taking seriously the infallible correlation between what Yahweh believes and the truth. Pike takes note of this correlation by saying:
Let us agree that had Jones actually refrained from mowing his lawn on Saturday, Yahweh would have believed otherwise than he did believe eighty years earlier.
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Pike then argues, however, that one may accept the claim that there is an infallible correlation between Yahweh's past beliefs and Jones's present actions, and yet reject the claim that Jones is free to refrain from mowing the lawn. Furthermore, he thinks that the acceptance of the infallible correlation provides a reason for doubting Jones's freedom.
But this observation [that had Jones refrained, Yahweh would have believed otherwise] takes no account of the facts working in the case before us. Jones did in fact mow his lawn on Saturday. Thus Yahweh did in fact believe eighty years earlier that Jones would mow his lawn on Saturday. On Saturday Jones did not have the power to perform an act the performance of which would require that Yahweh not have believed as He in fact believed eighty years earlier. By the time Saturday got here, Yahweh's belief was tucked away eighty years in the past. Nothing that Jones was able to do on Saturday could have had the slightest bearing on whether Yahweh held a certain belief eighty years earlier.
Since Yahweh's belief is 'tucked away' safely in the past, Jones is not free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh would have held a different belief. Consequently, Pike argues, option (ii) does not provide a basis for the claim that Jones is free to refrain from mowing the lawn. Pike repeats his argument in a response to Plantinga, only this time it is presented in terms of possible worlds:
If we assume that what is within my power at a given moment determines a set of possible worlds, all of the members of that set will have to be worlds in which what has happened in the past relative to the given moment is precisely what has happened in the past relative to that moment in the actual world. Going back now to the original problem, we have assumed that Jones does X at Ti. The question before us is whether it is within Jones' power at T2 to refrain from doing X. Plantinga assumes that this is to ask whether there is a possible world in which Jones refrains from doing X at 7~2. His answer is that there is -it is a world in which God does not believe at T\ that Jones refrains from doing X at Tiz. But Plantinga has not formulated the question correctly. He has not taken account of the restrictions that must be respected if one is to employ a ' possible worlds' analysis of what it is for something to be within one's power. The question is not whether there is just some possible world or other in which Jones refrains from doing X at 72. What must be asked is whether there is a possible world, having a history prior to 7~2 that is indistinguishable from that of the actual world, in which Jones refrains from doing X at Ta. The answer is that there is not. All such worlds contain an essentially omniscient being who believes at Ti that Jones does X at T2. There is no possible world of this description in which Jones refrains from doing X at T2.
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It is also supposed as immutable past fact that Yahweh existed eighty years ago, so that the last option is subject to an objection similar to that directed against option (ii).
In conclusion Pike suggests that if one wishes to maintain that an omniscient God exists and also that some human acts are performed with a free will, then one must either deny God a position in time so that his infallible knowledge is not foreknowledge, or one must weaken the notion of divine infallibility so that it is not impossible (in virtue of a doctrine of essential predication) for an infallible being to hold a false belief. While both of these resolutions of the foreknowledge problem deserve careful consideration, I shall not discuss either of them in this paper. Rather I shall suggest another way in which one might try to reconcile infallible foreknowledge with freedom. My effort will focus on option (ii), and on Pike's argument that a belief tucked away in the past is a fact that no one has the power to change.
At the centre of Pike's rejection of option (ii) is the following principle: (P) Since Yahweh's belief that Jones would mow the lawn is tucked away in the past, and since Jones cannot act so that a belief held at a prior time was not held at that prior time, Jones is not free to acf in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh would not have believed that Jones would mow the lawn.
It would seem that Pike's acceptance of (P) is grounded in a belief that the following three remarks form an inconsistent triad, that at least one of the three must be false :
(A) Yahweh (who is God and is thus essentially omniscient) exists with infallible foreknowledge of all human actions, including Jones's mowing the lawn. (B) Jones is free either to mow the lawn or to refrain from mowing the lawn. (G) Jones is not free to act on Saturday so that a belief held at an earlier point in time was not held at that earlier time.
Pike's view is that the negation of (C) is contradictory and (C) is analytically true. Consequently if one accepts the truth of (^4), consistency demands that one reject the truth of (B).
In support of the claim that (C) is analytically true Pike argues that Yahweh's belief is 'tucked away' in the past and that no action of Jones could have 'the slightest bearing' on whether a particular belief was held in the past. How far do such remarks go toward showing that (C) is indeed analytically true? They suggest that the denial of (C) would be tantamount to giving Jones the ability to causally or materially affect a state of affairs that existed in the past. Let us label the denial of (C) as {D) and the claim that Jones can causally or materially affect a past belief as (E):
(D) Jones is free to act on Satuday so that a belief held at an earlier point in time
was not held at that earlier time. (E) Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way he would causally or materially affect what Yahweh believed eighty years earlier.
If it were an analytic truth that one cannot causally or materially affect a past belief, so that (E) would be a contradiction, and if (D) entailed (E), then Pike would be correct in thinking that (D) was a contradiction and thus that (C) was an analytic truth. A comparison of the language used in formulating (ii), (C), and (D) reveals that a shift has occurred which may affect our evaluation of (C). Option (ii) speaks of Jones being free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh would have held a different belief; (D) speaks of Jones being free to act so that a belief that was held by Yahweh was not held. Let us consider alternatives to (C) and (Z>) that conform more to the language of option (ii).
(C) Jones is not free to act on Saturday in a way such that were he to act in that way a belief held at an earlier point in time would not have been held at that earlier time. (D') Jones is free to act on Saturday in a way such that were he to act in that way a belief held at an earlier point in time would not have been held at that earlier time.
A theologian who thinks that foreknowledge and freedom are compatible and who accepts the truth of both (A) and (B) is likely to adopt the formulation modelled on option (ii); focusing on (C) rather than on (C) he will deny that (£") is analytically true. The reason for this preference is that (Z>'), which is the negation of (C), is formulated to avoid any suggestion that Jones has the ability to causally or materially affect a state of affairs that existed in the past. Because (Z)') does not entail (E), it is unclear on what grounds one could conclude that (Z)') was a contradiction or that (C) was analytically true.
The theologian who believes in the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom may believe that (Z)') is true and at the same time give full endorsement to the claim that Yahweh's beliefs are ' tucked away' in the past. Such a theologian is likely to argue that in virtue of the infallible foreknowledge attributed to Yahweh in (A), we know that if Jones mows the lawn on Saturday Yahweh will have believed that he was going to mow the lawn, and if Jones refrains from mowing the lawn Yahweh will have believed that he was going to refrain. Furthermore since what is foreknown occurs, Jones does mow the lawn. Thus (A) provides justification for the counter-factual claim: if Jones had refrained from mowing the lawn, which he did not, Yahweh would have believed that he was going to refrain. Furthermore, suppose we utilize criteria normally employed for determining whether or not Jones freely mowed the lawn. We may note, for example, that Jones consciously reached his decision to mow the lawn after considering all of his options, that no one placed any pressure on him, that he was not suffering from any mental illness, etc. By itself this information may make it reasonable to believe (B). From (A) and (B) together it would follow that (Z)') was true: Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh would have held a belief different from the one he in fact held. Pike has claimed that (A), (B) , and (C) form an inconsistent triad. In fact, the theologian may argue, only if (C) is taken as equivalent to (C), which does not entail (E), is the triad inconsistent. So interpreted neither (C) nor (C) is analytically true, and the evidence that supports (A) and (B) also supports the claim that (C) is false.
Nonetheless, Pike may wish to respond, there still are good reasons for thinking (C) is analytically true. At the time of Jones's choice Yahweh's belief that Jones would mow the lawn is firmly secure in the past. As we have seen, Pike responded to Plantinga with the claim that the possible worlds representing what is within Jones's power on Saturday are worlds that branch at Saturday and not worlds that branch eighty years ago. Even if {D'), the denial of (C), does not entail (E), one who accepts (D') is committed to the view that by one's present action one can control which possible world was actual in the past.
The theologian may reply, however, that this is an odd but acceptable consequence of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Past beliefs and present free actions are infallibly correlated, and even though a present free action can have no causal or material effects on past beliefs, one still may have the power to refrain from the present action. One may assign this power to a person if the present action meets the normal criteria for whether an action is freely done, whatever those criteria may be. One knows, furthermore, that if the power had been exercised and the individual had refrained from acting, then the past belief concerning the action would have been different.
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The preceding discussion provides us with a way of understanding St Augustine's position on foreknowledge. Pike has suggested that St Augustine would deal with the foreknowledge problem by denying a strong sense of divine infallibility. Yahweh is infallible (in the strong sense) if and only if it is impossible (in virtue of a doctrine of essential predication) for Yahweh to hold a false belief.
1 Pike begins by noting that Augustine thinks divine foreknowledge and human foreknowledge are similar. Then Pike claims that human foreknowledge does not entail a lack of freedom, since there is no logical inconsistency in saying that a human being is free to act in a way such that the belief of another person, who is fallible, would have been false. The conclusion Pike draws is that Augustine must want to hold that people are free to make Yahweh's beliefs false. If Augustine's thinking proceeded along these lines, he could not also hold that Yahweh was infallible in the strong sense defined above.
While Pike's interpretation may have some merit, it is not the only possible interpretation. Consider a few sentences, which admittedly are not paradigms of clarity, from Augustine's discussion of the foreknowledge problem in On Free Will:
When we will, if the will itself is lacking in us, we surely do not will. If it cannot happen that when we will we do not will, then the will is present in the one who wills. And nothing else is in our power except what is present to us when we will. Our will, therefore, is not a will unless it is in our power. And since it is indeed in our power, it is free in us. What we do not, or cannot, have in our power is not free for us. So it follows that we do not deny that God has foreknowledge of all things to be, and yet that we will what we will. For when He has foreknowledge of our will, it is going to be the will that He has foreknown. Therefore, the will is going to be a will because God has foreknowledge of it. Nor can it be a will if it is not in our power. Therefore, God also has knowledge of our power over it. So the power is not taken from me by His foreknowledge; but because of His foreknowledge, the power to will will more certainly be present in me since God, whose foreknowledge does not err, has foreknown that I shall have the power.
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There are two facts that Augustine seems to take as given: human freedom and infallible divine foreknowledge. He emphasizes that we may be certain of both of these things. In terms of the example of Jones mowing the lawn Augustine is asserting that there are independent justifications for both (A) and (B). We may accept the former as part of a theology of omniscience. We may accept the latter because Jones does what he wills and that is the only possible test (Augustine believes) for whether he acts freely: willing something but not freely is a contradiction in terms. Since we have already seen that the acceptance of (A) and (B) does not commit us to an acceptance of retrocausation, option (ii) may be judged acceptable: Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh would have believed eighty years ago that Jones would refrain from mowing the lawn. As I read the text then, Augustine's position is not that Yahweh lacks infallibility, in the strong sense of that term, but rather that people are free to act so that an infallible being would have had a different belief. Note that this kind of solution would apply to human foreknowledge and divine foreknowledge equally. In terms of the three options (i)-(iii), option (ii) would be acceptable whether Yahweh were fallible or infallible. If Yahweh were fallible, option (i) would be acceptable, also. Since Yahweh is assumed to be infallible and human beings are not infallible, divine and human foreknowledge are similar only in allowing for the truth of (ii); they are not identical because human foreknowledge allows for the truth of (i) as well.
IV
There is at least one other way one might try to reconcile infallible foreknowledge with freedom. Since it is less plausible, I believe, than the position adopted by St Augustine, I shall be brief. To begin, it is of course very difficult for human beings with limited knowledge to specify how Yahweh could have infallible knowledge of the future. Using remarks of John Calvin and Boethius as his support, Pike suggests that God's knowledge of the future must be understood as importantly similar to the knowledge of a crystal-ball gazer. Pike quotes Calvin as remarking that 'when we attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that all things have been and perpetually remain before his eyes'.
1 Like the crystal-ball gazer, God sees future events as if they were present. Of course God could not 'see' them using actual eyes since incorporeal beings have no eyes. Nonetheless perhaps he could have perceptions of those events, since it may not be incoherent to suppose that incorporeal beings with no organs of sense could have perceptions.
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It is difficult to know exactly how much of the normal perceptual situation carries over to God's 'seeing' the future. Often, the causal explanation for the occurrence of a visual perception involves reference to light waves striking an external object and being reflected into the eye. The explanation for an incorporeal being 'seeing' something will not involve light rays entering an eye; none the less, we may speculate that reference to an external object that is 'seen' might be included in the causal explanation for the 'seeing'. If this were so for cases of incorporeal 'seeing' where the perception and the thing perceived exist simultaneously, it might be so for cases of clairvoyant incorporeal 'seeing' as well, where the perception and the thing perceived exist at different times. Clearly this is just speculation: but if it were true, then the crystal-ball-gazing perception of an incorporeal being would have as a part of its causal explanation reference to the future event that is apprehended. If such were the case, an event at a later point in time would be an essential part of the causal explanation of a perception of that same event occurring at an earlier time.
If we were to assume that this kind of retrocausation was conceptually coherent and an essential part of divine foreknowledge, it would tell against principle (P). Yahweh's belief that Jones will mow his lawn on Saturday is not tucked away or buried as deeply as Pike suggests, if the mowing of the lawn itself plays a causal role in the formation of that belief. On this assumption, what Yahweh saw in the divine crystal ball and what he thus believed eighty years prior to Saturday would be causally affected by what Jones did on Saturday. Thus it is difficult to see how Yahweh's foreknowledge would constitute an objection to saying that Jones is free to act in a way such that were he to act in that way Yahweh's belief would have been different.
Of course to defend principle (P) against this attack one might produce an argument showing that it is not possible for an effect to temporally precede its cause. Alternatively one might produce an argument showing that divine 'perceptions' cannot be in a causal relationship with the world. Clearly, to articulate such defences and then evaluate them would be a large-scale undertaking, one which would carry us away from the issues specific to the foreknowledge problem. Rather than pursue this I would just note that one who defends (P) should be prepared to respond to this kind of objection. Evodius, with whom Augustine discussed the issue of foreknowledge and freedom, was like Pike in that he continued to be disturbed by the fact of divine knowledge existing in the past. No doubt this reaction was based on the belief that an acceptance of both (A) and (i?), both Yahweh's infallible foreknowledge and mankind's freedom, dictates an acceptance of the view that by his present actions a person is able to exercise some sort of control over what happened in the past. In an attempt to explore further whether this misgiving is justified I shall discuss a modified version of a paradox that goes under the name of 'Newcomb's Problem', a paradox that was first discussed by Robert Nozick.
1 This problem is isomorphic with the foreknowledge problem in interesting ways. I shall alter the paradox to make the isomorphism as close as possible. We begin with a choice that is offered to an individual, Joan, a choice that presents her with an opportunity to improve her financial situation.
The Choice. Joan is to be offered a choice between all the money that is in a box B, or all the money that is in the two boxes A and B. To guide her choice she is given some background information.
The Background Information, (a) There is $1,000 in a box A; (b) either there is nothing in box B, or there is $1,000,000 in box B; (c) one year ago, a second individual, Yvette, either put the $1,000,000 in box B or she left B empty, depending on the prediction Yvette made concerning Joan's choice; (d) if Yvette predicted that Joan would choose box B, then she placed the $ 1,000,000 in box B; (e) if Yvette predicted that Joan would choose the two boxes A and B together, then she placed nothing in box B; (/) Yvette is an infallible predictor in that it is impossible (in virtue of a doctrine of essential predication) for Yvette to predict incorrectly. (As Nozick and others discuss Newcomb's Problem, background condition (/) is replaced by ( / ' ) : 'In the past Yvette has offered similar choices to thousands of people, and each of her predictions has been correct -all those who chose box B received $1,000,000 and all those who chose boxes A and B received $1,000.' In some discussions it is added that Yvette has correctly predicted thousands of Joan's other choices, also.) (g) While knowing that Yvette is infallible, Joan does not know how Yvette is able to make her infallibly accurate predictions.
The Questions. Assuming that Joan wishes to maximize her gain, which choice should she make and why? Is Joan free in making her choice?
In debating which choice Joan should make, the following line of reasoning may be given in favour of choosing boxes A and B together. Yvette made her prediction about Joan's choice one year ago, and at that time either put money in box B or did not, in accordance with her prediction. (It is not important whether Yvette actually places the money in B at the time she makes the prediction. All that matters is that the amount of money in B at the time the box is opened be settled at the time of the prediction. For simplicity I shall assume in my discussion that Yvette predicts and then seals the boxes at the time of the prediction.) Yvette's action was one year ago: it is final, it cannot be changed. If Yvette placed the $1,000,000 in box B, then the choice of box B will result in a gain of $1,000,000 whereas the choice of boxes A and B together will result in a gain of $1,001,000. If Yvette placed nothing in box B, then the choice of box B will result in no gain, whereas the choice of boxes A and B together will result in a gain of $1,000. So no matter which action Yvette took one year ago, Joan will maximize her gain by choosing boxes A and B together. This line of reasoning may be supplemented with critical reflections directed against the choice of box B alone. All the people who were offered this choice in the past and who received $1,000,000 by a choice of box B made the wrong choice, given that they wished to maximize their gain. Similarly all the people who received $1000 by a choice of boxes A and B made the right choice, given that they wished to maximize their gain. For at the time they made their choice there was in fact either $1000 of $1,001,000 in the two boxes. In either case, this is money they would have received if they had chosen both boxes. The choice of A and B together would not make any money in B disappear, just as the choice of box B would not make any money appear in B. In either case the choice could not alter which prediction had been made a year prior to the choice, and could not alter the action of Yvette based on that prediction. The choice of box B alone is unwise because it presupposes, so it seems, a belief that by an action at one point in time Joan can exercise control over what action Yvette had taken a year prior to that point in time.
It must be noted that a person who defends a choice of boxes A and B with arguments like these is totally ignoring the fact of Yvette's infallible predictive accuracy; all of the same arguments and considerations could be presented if item (/) of the background information were dropped. Indeed, if we had no information about Yvette's predictive ability, then the case for a choice of A and B would be totally persuasive. As it is, the fact that Yvette's infallible predictive ability has been totally ignored is a reason for hesitation, and for not immediately accepting the argument in favour of choosing boxes A and B together.
Let us now examine the counter-arguments in favour of a choice of box B alone. Yvette infallibly predicts which choice Joan will make. If Joan chooses box B, Yvette will have predicted that Joan was going to choose box B and she will have put the $1,000,000 in that box. Thus the choice of box B will yield a gain of $1,000,000. In contrast, if Joan chooses boxes A and B, Yvette will have predicted that Joan was going to choose boxes A and B, and she will have put nothing in box B. Thus the choice of boxes A and B will yield only $1000. Consequently in order to maximize her gain Joan should choose box B. This line of reasoning may be supplemented with critical reflections directed against the choice of boxes A and B together. In the past, people who chose boxes A and B and received only $1000 were penalized for ignoring one important element of the background information, namely the information that Yvette is an infallibly correct predictor. There is no point in considering that the prediction and choice might be different. Given Yvette's predictive ability, the only possibilities are a prediction of box B and a subsequent choice of box B, or a prediction of boxes A and B and a subsequent choice of boxes A and B. If we consider a person who chose boxes A and B and received $1000, we may not be able to say of her that she would have created the $1,000,000 in box B by her choice, if she had chosen box B alone. But we may say with some confidence that if her choice had been different, then the prediction would have been different and she would have received the $1,000,000. The choice of boxes A and B together is unwise because one who favours that choice must ignore the infallible correlation between predictions and choices.
Opponents of this view may believe that a person who defends a choice of box B with arguments like these is totally ignoring the fact that it was settled one year ago whether the money would be in box B. If that aspect of background condition [c) were dropped, all the same arguments in favour of box B could still be given. Suppose in place of (c) we were to substitute (c r ):
(c 1 ) After Joan makes her choice a second individual, Yvette, either puts $1,000,000 in B or leaves B empty, depending on Yvette's infallible knowledge of Joan's choice.
(Background conditions (d) and (e) would also have to be altered to mention knowledge rather than predictions.) It may be argued that if the problem were set up this way, then the case for choosing box B alone would be totally persuasive. As it is, one must realize that at the time of the choice there is either $1,001,000 or $1000 in the two boxes. A choice of box B cannot yield all the money that is in both boxes, for that choice turns its back on the $1000 that in fact is present in box A at the time of the choice. To give up that $1000 with the expectation of greater gain is to act on the assumption that one can exercise control over whether or not one year ago the $1,000,000 was placed in box B. The fact that one has totally ignored that the money's presence or absence was settled a year ago is a reason for hesitation and for not immediately accepting the argument in favour of choosing box B alone.
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Having presented two opposing positions on a modified version of Newcomb's Problem, we see that advocates from both sides seem to ignore important aspects of the background conditions. Those who advocate a choice of boxes A and B together seem to ignore the fact that Yvette is an infallible predictor; those who advocate a choice of box B alone seem to ignore the fact that it is already settled whether or not there is $1,000,000 in box B. Let us now take a closer look at these alleged shortcomings. Essential to the argument for a choice of boxes A and B together is a comparison of four possible outcomes:
Yvette's prediction choice B A and B B $1,000,000 $0 A and B $1,001,000 $1000
The argument is that Joan is better off with a choice of boxes A and B together, no matter what Yvette's prediction was. In virtue of Yvette's infallibility, however, we know that there are only two, not four, possible outcomes:
Joan's Yvette's prediction choice B A and B B $1,000,000 Impossible A and B Impossible $1000
With only two possible outcomes the argument for boxes A and B together cannot get started; there must be four outcomes to compare if the choice of box B alone is to be criticized as a choice that does not maximize gain because it turns its back on a sure $1000. Since the assumption that there are four possible outcomes is essential to the defence of a choice of boxes A and B together, and since infallibility reduces the number of possible outcomes from four to two, it is not possible to present a cogent argument for the choice of boxes A and B together that does justice to the fact of Yvette's infallibility. The argument for box B alone may also seem to involve treating what is impossible as possible. For it may seem that Joan would choose box B alone only if she thought she could exercise control over the past, which is impossible. However, one who supports a choice of box B is not committed to a belief in retrocausation. We must distinguish two different claims: 
conditions (a)-(g).
A discussion of whether the choice Joan makes would be a free choice under the assumption of Yvette's essential infallibility raises exactly the same issues that were explored in our discussion of foreknowledge. Let us assume that Joan chose box B alone and received $1,000,000. The question whether Joan was free to choose boxes A and B together and obtain $1000 gets an affirmative answer only if there is also an affirmative answer to the question whether Joan was free to act in a way such that if she had acted in that way Yvette's prediction would have been different. Given that the only two possible outcomes of a choice, free or not, are $1,000,000 and $1000, the person who wishes the maximum gain after having accepted all the background conditions (a)-(g) should choose box B alone. This is so even though in so choosing one ignores a 'past fact', the fact that it is already settled whether there is money in box B. There is a paradox in that the choice which maximizes one's gain, the choice of box B alone, is a choice that from the perspective of past facts gives up a sure $1000. It is similarly paradoxical that those same past facts must be set aside by the theologian who would argue that Joan's choice of box B was a free choice or that Jones's mowing of the lawn was done freely. On choosing box B one can be reasonably certain that one has made the better of the two choices, since (a)-(g) show that $1,000,000 and $1000 are the only two possible outcomes, even though one must live with the uncomfortable knowledge that at the time of choosing box B there is in fact $1,001,000 in the two boxes. In arguing that foreknowledge and freedom are compatible, one knows that one is not thereby committed to the claim that one can causally or materially affect Yahweh's past beliefs, even though one must live with the uncomfortable knowledge that at the time of choosing, Yahweh's past belief is inalterably tucked away in the past.
In rejecting Pike's argument Plantinga claims that the following remark is 'perfectly innocent': (53*) It was within Jones's power at T2 to do something such that if he had done it, then God would not have held a belief that in fact he did hold.
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The remark is innocent in just this sense: it cannot be shown that someone who accepts (53 b) (which is equivalent to my (C)) must accept the thesis that Jones can causally or materially affect a past belief. The innocent is not perfect, however. After choosing box B Joan must be ready to make the following somewhat counter-intuitive remark if she believes that her choice was freely made: 'If I had chosen boxes A and B together, and it was within my power to do this, then I would not have received the $1,001,000 that actually was there, not because my choosing boxes A and B together would have made the money in B disappear, but because the money would never have been put there in the first place.' What is counter-intuitive and paradoxical is that when one thinks only of the fact that $1,001,000 was actually in the boxes at the time of the choice, one feels justified in responding: 'If you had chosen boxes A and B together, Joan, you would have received $1,001,000 because that's how much was there; since this outcome is not a possible one, however, it follows that you did not have the power to choose boxes A and B together.' In short, if on the one hand you assume as a premise that the choice was freely made, then you cannot also believe that if you had exercised a different choice the world up until the time of your choice would have been the same. It is odd to suppose one can by one's choice determine, if not causally or materially influence, which possible world existed prior to the time of that choice. If on the other hand you assume as a premise that there is no way in which a present choice could fix the past prediction unless one's choice could somehow causally or materially influence that prediction, which we have assumed is not possible, then you cannot believe that the choice was freely made. It is odd to suppose that a choice which meets all the tests for being free, and which would have been free if it had not been predicted by an infallible being, somehow is made not free just by the fact that it was predicted and that the predictor cannot be wrong.
Which is the more implausible assumption: (1) that somehow one has control over past beliefs even though one cannot causally or materially influence those beliefs; or (2) that an action otherwise free would become not free just because it was foreknown or predicted by an infallible being? (Recall Augustine's remark quoted earlier: 'the power is not taken from me by His foreknowledge.') The odd thing to note before one assigns greater implausibility to the first assumption is that in choosing box B (and anyone who accepts all of the background conditions {a)-(g) should choose box B, it seems, if they wish to maximize their gain), one acts with the sense, perhaps the illusion, that one can control what the past prediction was. The fact is that assumption (i) and assumption (2) are both extremely implausible, and, if such things could be measured, equally implausible. If one is willing to tolerate (2) as Pike is, then one can mount a case in support of (P), the claim that since Yahweh's belief is in the past, and since Jones is not free to act so that a past belief would have been different, therefore Jones is not free. If one is willing to tolerate (1) as Augustine and Plantinga seemingly are, then one can mount an attack against (P).
I would argue that we should not tolerate either (1) or (2). We should follow Augustine and Plantinga in rejecting (2): if infallible foreknowledge or predictive ability existed we would have sound reasons for believing it would not have a bearing on whether an action was performed freely. Freedom of action or the lack of it must be decided on other grounds. We should follow Pike in rejecting (1): if infallible foreknowledge or predictive ability existed we would have sound reasons for believing there would be no freedom of action. The assumption of free action requires a control over past beliefs or predictions that is not acceptable, even though no explicit statement about the possibility of retrocausation is entailed by that assumption. We find ourselves, then, in the inherently paradoxical situation of having good grounds for believing both that if there were infallible foreknowledge it would be irrelevant to the question whether human actions were free, and also that if there were infallible foreknowledge human action would not be free. Until someone shows why one line of thinking should take precedence over the other, a task which has yet to receive serious attention, the foreknowledge and freedom problem will remain an unresolved paradox. Defenders of the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom will independently argue for divine infallible foreknowledge and for human freedom and use the evidence they have gathered in this regard to support the claim that people have the power to act so that God would have held different beliefs. Those who believe foreknowledge and freedom are incompatible will argue that because one is not free to determine which possible world existed prior to the present moment, if there is foreknowledge then there is no human freedom. The arguments pass by one another because just as it is implausible to suppose that by a present action one can fix which possible world was actual in the past, so it is implausible to suppose that the knowledge of one individual, about the actions of another, could determine whether those actions were performed freely. Pike wants us to conclude: is it not odd that infallible foreknowledge takes away human freedom? Augustine would want us to conclude: is it not odd that we are free to act so that an infallible being would have held a different belief? While arguments have been produced in support of both of these conclusions, each of them is a bit too odd to accept without additional discussion.
More particularly, there are two queries I would address to someone like Pike who rejects the argument of Augustine and Plantinga that since (A) and (5) are true, (C) is false. First, what exactly is the argument that shows (C) is, in fact, a necessary truth? Second, if one accepts (C) as a necessary truth, then it seems one should also accept (J) as a necessary truth:
(J) J o a n is not free to choose in a way such that were she to choose in that way, Yvette's prediction at an earlier point in time would not have been made at that earlier time.
If Joan were to accept (J) as necessary she might say to herself: 'My choice either of box B alone or boxes A and B together is not going to be freely made, because (J) is a necessary truth; and I should choose box B alone to maximize my gain, because the outcomes $1,000,000 and 11000 are the only possible ones.' This is a paradoxical position since whatever argument would support the necessity of (J) would also seem to support the wisdom of choosing both boxes A and B together. If nothing Joan does has the slightest bearing on whether there is money in box B, there would seem to be no good reason for giving up the sure $1000 of box A. Does not the acceptance of box B alone as the best choice show that arguments in favour of the necessity of (C) or (J) are not as persuasive as they might seem?
